

# **PUTTING THE MONEY WHERE THE MOUTH IS—ODA in Mindanao: A View from the Communities**

By

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# I. Introduction

Take a cue from how local terminologies have evolved and one can easily appreciate how a certain issue or reality is perceived by communities. We hear small farmers, in their attempt to explain cropping performance, belt out the word “peylyur” (failure) from their assimilated agricultural vocabulary. Or how women invoke “baw” (vaw: violence against women) as an issue they have come to understand through their gender sensitivity trainings. Some more linguistic adaptations can be found in the use of phrases such as “peace of zones” (referring to peace zones or zones of peace), “por example” pointing out to unfinished road constructions which dot the countryside, and, to illustrate the phenomena of displacement, the term “bakwit” which has emerged a rallying concept among those who seek protection of their rights.

In the conflict-affected areas where we have been to as community development workers in Mindanao, “project” has become a byword associated with peace and development. With the slew of funds coming from foreign-assisted projects, mostly official development aid (ODA), former war-front communities have drawn their own version of the anticipated “peace dividends” from the MNLF-GRP Peace Agreement of 1996. It is not uncommon to hear these combatants and zone commands comparing the success of their peace initiatives in the form of facilities, infrastructure, and other such basic services which they have accessed after writing “proposals”, another jargon which has found its way to the long list of their newly acquired capacities.

Even when we were starting to catalyze processes towards the establishment of peace zones in some areas in the ARMM, the first question people usually asked was when and how much projects could possibly be generated from the initiative. This prevailing notion which equates peace with aid (in the form of projects) is reinforced by the pronouncements of the government last July 2003<sup>2</sup> on the inflow of US\$30 million in Mindanao once the peace agreement is signed between the MILF and GRP. The growing anticipation of some quarters is mixed with the trepidation of others and it might be useful to pick up some lessons from the past to inform further studies and action on how ODA-assisted initiatives can be made more relevant to the needs for Peace and Human Security in Mindanao, especially in the communities where effects of peace and conflict are most felt.

This paper aims to contribute to the Human Development Report focusing on *Peace, Human Security, and Human Development in the Philippines* by putting forward some issues which some community-based NGOs and people’s organizations have raised in the course of their own efforts to contribute to the attainment of lasting peace and development in Mindanao. In particular, it will focus on the role that ODA plays in support of the institutional response (Oquist, 2002)<sup>3</sup> which the government, from post-EDSA administration up to the present, has adopted as its “comprehensive approach to a just and lasting solution to the peace process”. This institutional approach, specifically referred to as a “long-term package of economic, political and cultural interventions” are outlined in the six paths of: a) social, economic and political reforms; b) consensus building; c) peace talks with different groups; d) reconciliation; e) protection of civilians and de-escalation of conflict including recognition of peace zones and protection of human rights; and f) building of a positive climate of peace—creating a culture of peace.

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<sup>2</sup> Front page of the Philippine Star, July 10, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Fifth Assessment Mission Report, Paul Oquist, UNDP, 2002.

## **II. Basic Facts on ODA in Mindanao**

The NEDA ODA Manual published in 2000 describes official development assistance as flows to developing countries that are provided by bilateral and multilateral institutions. Bilateral assistance is extended on a government to government basis, and programs of this nature are generally shaped by political decisions in a donor country. In contrast, multilateral aid consists of assistance coursed through a multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) system, the European Economic Community (EEC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank.

### **A. Goals and Forms of ODA**

In the Philippines, ODA flows are generally administered to accomplish two goals: promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries, and provide loans that are concessional in character and contain a grant component of at least 25 percent.

ODA may be for project assistance or non-project assistance. Non-project assistance is when aid is given to address a recipient country's financial and balance of payment problems such as program loans, including structural adjustment loans (SALs), community assistance and debt relief. Project assistance, on the other hand, is the more common form of ODA which, in the case of the Philippines, can either be capital intensive or technical assistance/ technical cooperation.

Capital intensive projects involve the financing of investments in fixed assets to strengthen the country's social and technological development by enhancing human institutional capabilities through the transfer and development of skills, knowledge and technology. It also covers provision of experts or consultancy services, training of local personnel, and limited capital goods or equipment for research and development, pre-investment studies, institution building, human resource development and other activities. These are all envisioned to supplement or enhance the technical competence or capabilities of local institutions for performance of their basic tasks or for project development.

### **B. ODA in Mindanao**

The 2002 MEDCO ODA update<sup>4</sup> mentions that "Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs and projects in the form of grants and mixed credit continue to strengthen Mindanao's drive towards economic development and poverty alleviation by meeting the island's infrastructure requirements and ensuring effective governance."

To further augment the needed financial resources to address poverty and peace problems in the island, according to the MEDCO update, there are 24 ongoing projects exclusively for Mindanao amounting to US\$964.9 million. Among thee projects which focused on poverty alleviation, rural development and peace resolution include a World Bank-assisted Mindanao Rural Development Project (MRDP) which aimed at specifically increasing agricultural production, efficiency and diversification of rural

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<sup>4</sup> Downloaded from <http://www.medco.com/updated> on 06/04/2002

economic activities, and the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) Social Fund, which is now the ARMM Social Fund (ASF) Program.

### C. ODA Commitments and Firm Pipeline

The 2002 MEDCO update cited the report from the National Economic Development Authority Public Investment Staff (NEDA-PIS), the total estimated value of ODA commitments and pipeline projects in Mindanao reached US\$261.2 million and US\$816.7 million. The September 2001 figure showed a decline in ODA commitments of 28.37 per cent while projects in the pipeline posted a remarkable increase of 110.66 percent compared to September 2000.

The Mindanao Investment Program<sup>5</sup> provides more detailed and updated figures which are cited in the following table capturing the Mindanao-wide and region-specific projects:

**Table 1: Ongoing Projects**

Location	Total Project Cost (in Million Php)				
	Social	Infrastructure	Economic	Dev't Admin.	ICT
Mindanao-wide		1530	8024.531	287.109855	0.06783
Inter-regional	6223.96		11584.98935		
Region IX	438.6	4055.55			
Region X		2458.34800	26.01	213.18	
Region XI	289.4	1018.36			
Region XII	194.82	258.66	154.054		
CARAGA		12675.802		105.091858	
ARMM	3 0.09	4417.74	11.83	52	

Source: Mindanao Investment Program FY 2004-2006, Vol.2

Economic projects have been heavily invested although because they are reflected here as inter-regional and Mindanao-wide in location, it is difficult to determine the effect these projects have on the specific regions aside from the data already mentioned on the region-specific projects. For these projects, ARMM got the lowest amount of economic projects investment.

Of the total ongoing projects invested in Mindanao for 2004-2006, the next biggest amount is invested in infrastructure with Regions X and Caraga getting the highest ranking. The two- conflict affected regions of Region IX and ARMM rank lower than Caraga.

The following tables describe the amount which goes to specified projects which have already been committed and are in the pipeline:

<sup>5</sup> Mindanao Investment Program FY 2004-2006, Vol. 2

**Table 2: Committed Projects**

Location	Total Project Cost (in Million Php)				
	Social	Infrastructure	Economic	Dev't Admin.	ICT
Mindanao-wide	29.835				
Inter-regional	10.02	830.79	70.771884		
Region IX		46			
Region X		1160.417647			
Region XI					
Region XII					
CARAGA					
ARMM	2	46.19			

Source: Mindanao Investment Program FY 2004-2006, Vol.2

**Table 3: Pipeline Projects**

Location	Total Project Cost (in Million Php)				
	Social	Infrastructure	Economic	Dev't Admin.	ICT
Mindanao-wide	101.85		213		7.65
Inter-regional	878.98	4573.46	4351.83		
Region IX		265.61		784.1	
Region X		19.74	3105.594		
Region XI	5	1018.38		50	
Region XII					
CARAGA	2326				
ARMM	179.42	222.36	509.29	67.32	

Source: Mindanao Investment Program FY 2004-2006, Vol.2

Again, the projects on infrastructure and economic are getting the biggest investment in terms of total costs and this remains true for the proposed projects where Mindanao-wide projects on infrastructure rank highest in terms of amount of investment while economic and social types of projects follow the list as can be seen from the subsequent table:

**Table 4: Proposed Projects**

Location	Total Project Cost (in Million Php)				
	Social	Infrastructure	Economic	Dev't Admin.	ICT
Mindanao-wide	36.73	202310.203		3212.5307	229.37
Inter-regional	367	23167.66	234.115		
Region IX	109.361	3017.313	293.937	47807.839	155.66
Region X	974.458	36954.196	397.814	1944.24942	68.88
Region XI	976.73	2626.78	3506.72	756.318	
Region XII	393.67	17864.28	3098.033	9.981	
CARAGA	566.44	17693.237	619.24935	65	205
ARMM	912.284	5862.746	1222.239	2161.453	21.76

Source: Mindanao Investment Program FY 2004-2006, Vol.2

#### **D. Donor Sources of ODA**

According to the MEDCO update, the Government of Japan (GOJ) remains the largest source of assistance through the Japan International Cooperation (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). The GOJ contributed an estimated amount of US\$1.17 billion for Mindanao. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) adds up the island's \_\_\_\_\_ (PDA) investments by US\$759.56 million while WB, in its continuing efforts towards poverty alleviation and rural development, also contributed a total amount of US\$17.7 million. Other bilateral and multi-lateral donors include governments of Spain (US\$50.2m), Italy (US\$43m), Korea (US\$35.7m), Kuwait (US\$19.8m), among others.

### **III. Focus on ARMM as an Institutional Response to Peace and Human Security**

ARMM, as a political administrative entity, is the product of several policy and institutional approaches attempted by the National Government to end decades of war between Philippine central authorities and Muslim revolutionary groups in the southern Philippines.

The World Bank publication on Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in the ARMM<sup>6</sup> (November 2000) notes how difficult it is to determine the total amount of ODA going to ARMM as these funds are extended to ARMM beneficiaries through various channels. Based on information from the ARMM Regional Government through the Regional Economic and Development Planning Office, there were about 29 ongoing foreign-assisted projects in 2000 that reach ARMM. Of these, seven are in human development with the aim of improving the delivery of basic social services, especially in poor and vulnerable communities.

Most of these projects, according to the WB publication, are national programs of national government agencies in which ARMM's involvement is driven by the need to reach targeted communities within the Region. It further cites that there are a number of Mindanao-wide programs, such as Basic Education Development Assistance for Mindanao, Growth with Equity Mindanao II, and the Midwife Entrepreneurs' Program, where the ARMM is one of the more intensively targeted areas for ODA resources.

### **IV. Issues on the Peace Impact of Projects**

While there is recognition of the need for more systematic discourse and research on the impact of ODA-assisted programs and projects, some questions are already being surfaced by community based organizations and advocacy networks as starting points.

#### **A. Counting People's Realities in**

Situated within a comprehensive package of political, economic and cultural reforms, these projects are deemed as significant vehicles for increasing confidence and trust in the peace process among various peace stakeholders, whether armed and unarmed.

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<sup>6</sup> Human Development Sector Unit of the World Bank (2003 November). Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in ARMM.

Participation of the broader populace in these projects is thus an essential element for the achievement of goals beyond the material gains resulting from having access to these projects.

In September 1999, the CO Multiversity completed an External Monitoring and Assessment of the SZOPAD Social Fund to summarize local stakeholders' perspectives on the initial projects which were implemented up to August 1999. Most of the findings point to the need to make the projects more participatory, relevant and needs-based. To cite some of these findings:

- There is an uneven response from the non-beneficiaries of the SSF projects in terms of knowledge and information. Except for the Maguindanao and Cotabato areas, the rest of the areas where data gathering was done indicated that there was little information about the SSF reaching them. The information that most non-beneficiaries know is that this is a project of the MNLF and therefore only MNLF members are qualified to benefit. Approximately 30% of the respondents said that the MNLF members who benefited from the SSF were younger ones who did not participate in the long struggle and that those who were in the revolution for a long time continue to suffer in poverty and do not get any share of the peace dividend.
- On the appraisal system, the SSF system was largely dependent on the demand side of the proponents based on the information that SSF was supporting small infrastructure projects. The project proponents tended to be the family or close connections of the state chairs and/or the zone commanders because, initially, the information and the proposal were coursed through these two institutions. According to the SSF, this was a necessary action since the mandate of the Fund was to fast track the delivery of assistance. Therefore, there was little, if at all, consultation with the people. The community did not have the chance to interact and be part of the decision because of the fast tracking of the assistance.
- A consequence of the fast tracking of the assistance was the deluge of proposals from different parts of ARMM. However, the requirements before an organization can be a proponent are extensive and difficult to gather, according to some proponents. There are also some projects which do not benefit the community because they serve only the few people who are close to the project proponents or managers.
- Due to the lack of participation by the people on the project design and construction there is very little ownership of the project. This is especially true for the madrasah buildings whose ownership is sometimes unclear. Therefore the maintenance of the infrastructure is not guaranteed. There are some projects, which are being maintained by the beneficiaries, but the majority of the respondents were unclear about their participation in the maintenance of the sub-projects.
- Lack of participation of women in the design and decision making of the projects was evident in all of the areas visited.

As a result of that study, the second phase of the SZOPAD Fund contracted the services of NGOS to help undertake capacity building interventions for a period of six months for communities which had received projects such as solar dryers, warehouses and other such facilities which, in the study, were found idle and whose use were limited to the

project proponents and managers. The interventions were aimed at generating the interest and participation of people to make better use of the facilities and included assessments and training sessions. While the intention was considered laudable, the timing was rather late as it came at the heels of an implemented project and it is more likely to be less successful in mobilizing people's participation.

In order to determine how the subsequent phases of the Social Fund have become more participatory or not, there is a need to review whether the recommendations resulting from the assessments have been taken into account in the design of the other bilateral programs.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> phase of the UN Multi-Donor Programme seems to have discovered a workable formula for ensuring people's participation as it cites in its Evaluation Report<sup>7</sup> (June 2004) the Peace and Development Communities (PDCs) as the "focal point of the Programme's intervention which appeared to be the most important innovation in mobilizing the community: local government units (LGUs); the non-government organizations (NGOs); the national government agencies (NGAs); and other stakeholders' resources in implementing projects for peace and development".

The report further mentions the consensus among PDAs, National UN Volunteers (NUNVs), the Volunteers for Information and Development Assistance (VIDAs) and members of PDCs during various FGDs conducted by the mission the role that the PDCs have played in mobilizing people's participation and achieving the goals of peace and development as follows:

- The PDC, in general, made the community peaceful. First, the army and other armed groups respect the community if they knew that it was a PDC. Second, the community organizing and training given to the PDC members empowered the community to engage in development work, and third, volunteerism made the community realize that they can do something for themselves.
- The PDC enabled the formulation of the Barangay Development Plan (BDP) with broad participation of the people in the community. The BDPs are integrated in the Municipal Development Plans (MDPs). This enable the community to access other sources of funding for their projects (e.g. PDC Munoz).
- The PDC facilitates conflict management at the community level, at the same time complementing the traditional institutions of the community that deals with managing conflict. Muslim PDC members state that conflict management for Muslims is done through consultative process following Islamic laws
- The PDC increased the capability of the community to do development projects. This capability building includes skills training and management
- The PDAs stated that trust and confidence with the government has increased during the MDP3. They estimated that 70% of MNLF communities trust the government.

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<sup>7</sup> UNDP. An Evaluation of the GOP-UN Multi-Donor Programme: Assessment of Performance and Results, pp. 5-8.

More studies on these kind of innovations to strengthen people's participation need to be undertaken and utilized by ODA-assisted programs to ensure that these initiatives are able to count in the people's realities and aspirations.

### **B. Articulating ARMM aspirations as an autonomous government**

An issue on whether the ODA-assisted projects are effective in enabling the articulation of ARMM aspirations as an autonomous government was raised in the WB Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in ARMM document.

The report observes that while the ODA projects provide supplementary resources welcome to such a disadvantaged area like ARMM, the projects themselves, being of nationwide or Mindanao-wide application, are unlikely to be suitable channels for expressing or articulating the aspirations of ARMM as an *autonomous government*. Most often, these projects feature planning and implementation strategies that go directly to the lowest possible LGUs, in some cases, the communities themselves and involve minimal technical participation, financial inputs or managerial involvement from agencies of the Regional Government.

In fairness to the managers and funders of these projects, according to the report, the non-involvement of the Regional Government in some cases did not happen by design but occurred by default due to weak capacity. Furthermore, incidents of conflict have been known to lead to the scaling down, suspension or cancellation of activities in the ARMM in favor of more hospitable areas where needs exist but conditions do not allow for development work to proceed more predictably.

As a measure to respond to this need to determine how the ODA-assisted projects enable the articulation of ARMM goals and aspirations, President Arroyo signed in November 2002 Executive Order No. 125 entitled "Further Enhancing the Devolution of Powers and Functions, Programs and Projects of National Government Agencies to the Autonomous Regional Government of the ARMM", which stipulates the creation of an ARMM ODA office under the Office of the Regional Governor of ARMM. Two years after the EO was passed, it would be useful to assess how the ODA office has been able to handle matters relating to the accessing of ODA for ARMM programs and projects. The issue of participation and relevance of programs can also be an area for study.

### **C. Ploughing back their share of the ODA pie**

The visibility of numerous expatriates sent in as consultants and technical experts for ODA-assisted programs raises the question of how much ODA funds are ploughed back to the sponsor countries. The Institute of Philippine Culture research entitled "Reforming Technical Cooperation: the Philippine Experience" devotes a section describing the consultancy mechanisms in the technical assistance projects funded through ODAs.

The study has identified the role of Filipino engineers, scientists economists and other professionals as consultants, either as members or partners in local consulting firms; individuals directly hired by government (Philippine or foreign, national or local), business firms, or multilateral or bilateral aid agencies; or professionals hired by a local or foreign consulting company that has won the bid for a project. In the development aid

field, bilateral and multilateral agencies have tapped local consultants, particularly for Philippine projects.

It is a common practice though for bilateral organizations to tap their nationals (individuals or firms) as principal consultants who may then partner with a local consultant or consulting firm. Lower rates are provided to the Filipino consultants as compared to the expatriates, and when local consultants are subcontracted by foreign or international consulting firms, task assignments include field or leg work and downstream activities. Moreover, the IPC study refer to how local consultants have complained about being overworked and underpaid and how they end up doing the bulk of the work as much of it involves interviews or field work.

Compare the staggering figures which amount up to consultants' and technical experts' honoraria and how much it took the Iranun Farmers' Association of Brgy. Bayanga Norte in Matanog, Maguindanao to install a barangay electrification cooperative in their village within the defense perimeter of Camp Abubakar, and one cannot help but ask whether we are putting ODA money into its most judicious use. Forty thousand pesos Php 40,000 is approximately half of the monthly salary of a field program manager and a quarter of a regional manager's rates. If we look at a two year program meframe, it is easy to infer how many POs would have been able to install their own much-awaited power systems. In Brgy. Mataya, Buldon of the same province, the same amount was used to build a multi-purpose center which now serves as the nucleus of the ongoing peace dialogues and conflict mediation processes which the local organization is spearheading.

NGOs who work with some US-based donors have also experienced having to agree, as part of the terms of reference, to purchase equipment which are US-made or US-branded. Again, this raises the issue of whose economy these projects are boosting.

#### **D. Doing More Good**

In the early 90s, a number of international and Local NGOs, collaborated through the Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) to learn more about how aid that is given in conflict settings interact with the conflicts. It had been recognized that aid is often used and misused by people in conflicts to pursue political and military advantage and these groups sought to understand how this occurs in order to prevent that from happening.

The Do No Harm framework raises questions which are helpful in assessing ODA programs and some of these are:

- a. ***related to programming***: where and why is aid offered, who are the staff (external and internal), how are they hired, who are the intended recipients of assistance, by what criteria are they included, what is provided, who decides, how is aid delivered, warehoused and distributed?
- b. ***related to interactions of each aspect of the aid program with existing dividers and connectors***-- who gains and loses from the aid? Do these groups overlap with the divisions identified as potentially or actually destructive? Are we supporting military activities or civilian structures? Are we missing or ignoring opportunities to reinforce connectors? Are we inadvertently undermining or weakening local capacities for peace?

c. *related to implicit ethical messages*—what are the intangible impacts that aid workers feel their own actions and attitudes have on conflict? Do we promote practices that reinforce military thinking, intolerance, inequity and injustice, etc.?

More than the concern for infrastructure and economic development which, as outlined in the previous sections, get the biggest share of ODA investments, initiatives for rebuilding confidence and trust in the peace process should be emphasized. In Mindanao, several NGOs and even local government units in some provinces, have already started to come together in various collaborative activities as a result of years of painstaking work among those who seek genuine and lasting peace in Mindanao. These groups have mobilized peace advocates in attempting to manage peace processes at the local level through a broad range of strategies as organizing, culture of peace education, multi-stakeholders' dialogues, peace covenant declarations, conflict mediation, monitoring of local peace agreements, psycho-social healing, and reconciliation. With a strong foundation of a collective sense of victory and trust for one another, development projects are then undertaken with more responsibility, participation and empowering approaches.

These are activities which promote peace and human security and development in the truest sense of the word. As Fr. Bert Layson, Immaculate Conception Parish of Pikit parish priest and peacemaker, himself says, “peacebuilding should not only look into restoring the physical damages brought about by conflict but the more invisible effects on the relationships of people.” This might be the missing element in many of the ODA-assisted projects which we should continue to review with an eye for looking into whether we are indeed doing more good than harm.

### **E. Measuring Peace and Conflict Impact**

Considering the fact that ODA in Mindanao is being utilized within the peace and conflict context, one needs a different lens with which to look at its impact in the overall goals which it seeks to achieve. Development is seen as a countervailing measure for violent ways of resolving conflict as it seeks to address underlying causes of conflict such as poverty, exclusion, and other structural factors.

However, organizations in peace zone- communities in Maguindanao and Lanao Sur which agencies such as the Local Government Support Program (LGSP)<sup>8</sup> and The Asia Foundation (TAF)<sup>9</sup> have provided with capacity building support for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment are learning that development does not always bring peace and, in fact, in many instances have even exacerbated the causes of conflict. These Peace Advocates among LGU and civil society groups in some peace zones are cautiously watching for signals which point to more conflict and more harm as they employ processes enabling them to critically assess projects being undertaken in their communities. In one instance, a community project for animal raising was scrapped because they saw the potential for breeding more divisions among the residents with the need to select only a few beneficiaries. In its place, a water system, envisioned to be more unifying and beneficial to majority of the people, was selected and implemented.

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<sup>8</sup>Documentation of Proceedings, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Training for Sindaw Ko Kalilintad Peace Advocates. Supported by the LGSP, St. Joseph's Retreat Center, Cotabato City, August 2003.

<sup>9</sup> Project Report of a ten-month project on Addressing Community Resource Conflict through PCIA and Mediation Capacities, Supported by TAF, October 2004- June 2005.

The PCIA approach and tool, which has found meaning in the local language of the people who have used it, imbues organizations with the power of information and analysis so that they do not become mere recipients or beneficiaries but genuine partners in the projects which development institutions seek to implement in their communities.

The areas it attempts to look for potential peace and conflict impact<sup>10</sup> are in:

- a) conflict management processes which refer to capacity to identify and respond to peacebuilding opportunities and conflict-creating challenges. This would include formal instruments (such as strengthening legal mechanisms or creating dispute resolution boards) or more informal mechanisms (such as low-key meetings, community leader interventions, creating channels for local level dialogue, tapping the peacebuilding abilities of neglected segments in the community such as women);
- b) militarized violence and human security - direct and indirect impact on (1) patterns and levels of violence by militarised forces; and (2) an individual's and community's sense of security or insecurity -- including physical and mental well-being and sense of individual or group identity
- c) political structures and processes-- formal and informal political structures and processes – this could apply from the local municipal level through to the national level. It refers to both the strengthening/ weakening of the governance capacities of different levels of government, *and* the ability/inability of civil society actors to participate in the political process actively and constructively.
- d) economic structures and processes-- strengthening or weakening equitable socio-economic structures and processes; distortion/conversion of war economies; economic infrastructure; conflicts over access to scarce basic goods; availability of investment capital to create economic and employment alternatives to war-fighting; the stability of the banking system; increasing or decreasing the economic dependence on military (or military-related) employment; productivity and the equitable distribution of non-war/ peace benefits; training; income generation; production of commercial products or services; food in/security; the exploitation, generation, or distribution of resources, esp. non-renewable resources and the material basis of economic sustenance or food security.
- e) social empowerment-- creation of a culture of peace characterized by constructive social communication, tolerance, inclusiveness, justice, gender equity, participation, and respect. Confidence and capacity of all members of society (from the "weakest" to the "strongest") to effectively overcome obstacles to living a life which is good and satisfying.

These five elements help to make peace and human security interventions holistic. As most institutions have found out, an integrated perspective and approach is an imperative to finding just and lasting solutions to the situation in Mindanao. The question is: how many of the ODA-assisted projects are ready to find precious time to undertake development work at the pace of peace?

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<sup>10</sup> Kenneth Bush, Building Capacity for Peace and Unity, Federation of Canadian Municipalities and the Local Government Support Program. 2004, pp. 54-58.

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